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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Hazardous substances disproportionally impact minority 
cRPPXQLWLeV, SaUWLcXOaUO\ NN¶V. AV Rf 2014, URXghO\ WZeQW\-five 
percent of the United States superfund sites, could be found on land 
in Indian Country.1 For Native communities, whose cultural 
identities are intertwined with the land around them, harm to the 
environment can be profoundly destructive. Professor Rebecca 
Tsosie suggests that an Native world view can be defLQed aV: ³a 
perception of the earth as an animate being; a belief that humans are 
in a kinship system with other living things; a perception of the land 
aV eVVeQWLaO WR Whe LdeQWLW\ Rf Whe SeRSOe[.]´2 This world view sets 
the foundation for understanding environmental harms in Indian 
Country through an ecological model, studying interactions between 
humans, animals, plants, and their physical surroundings.3 This note 
examines harms caused to the environment greater than merely 
disrupting a natural balance that previously existed, specifically 
harms caused by noxious substances that are poisonous to the land. 
The EPA website begins its Environmental Justice timeline 
with the Memphis Sanitation Strike in 1968.4 This civil-rights era 
strike helped pave the way for later protests when a small African 
American Community in Warren County, North Carolina was 
VeOecWed aV a dXPSLQg VLWe fRU PRO\chORULQaWed bLSheQ\OV (³PCB´), 
gathering national attention.56 Protestors believed that Warren 
 
1 Terri Hansen, Kill the Land, Kill the People: There Are 532 Superfund Sites in 
Indian Country!, Indian Country Today, June 17, 2014, 
https://intercontinentalcry.org/kill-land-kill-people-532-superfund-sites-indian-
country-24366 [https://perma.cc/879A-GAVH]; CERCLA is informally known 
as the Superfund, which allows the EPA to clean sites contaminated from 
hazardous waste, known as superfund sites, 
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/what-superfund [https://perma.cc/CMM2-9357]. 
2 Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: 
The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 Vt. 
L. Rev. 225, at 226 (1996). 
3 ³IQdLaQ CRXQWU\´ LV Whe OegaO WeUP Rf aUW fRU Whe geRgUaShLc WeUULWRU\ gRYeUQed 
by a tribal government, and today is defined by federal statute at 18 U.S.C. 
Section 1151.  MELISSA L. TATUM & JILL KAPPUS SHAW, LAW, CULTURE & 
ENVIRONMENT 19 (2014).  
4 Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Justice Timeline, EPA.GOV, 
www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/environmental-justice-timeline 
[https://perma.cc/99T6-M36U] (last updated June 2, 2017).  
5 Office of Legacy Management, Environmental Justice History, ENERGY.GOV, 
www.energy.gov/lm/services/environmental-justice/environmental-justice-
history [https://perma.cc/H2FC-PHQD] (last visited November 15, 2019). 
6 Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice in the 21st Century: Race Still 
Matters, 49 PHYLON 151 (2001).  
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County, and similar communities chosen for dumping hazardous 
waste, were selected based on race and income.7 In Environmental 
Law in Indian Country, William Rodgers argues that Chairman of 
the Yakama Nation, Alex Saluskin, first outlined the concept of 
eQYLURQPeQWaO MXVWLce ZheQ he ZURWe ³SWaWePeQW Rf The YaNaPa 
Indians in Defense of Their Vested Fishing and Property Rights as 
Celilo Falls in the Columbia River that will be Destroyed by the 
Construction of the Dalles Lock aQd DaP´ (³SaOXVNLQ DRcXPeQW´) 
in 1953.8 The thirty-seven page Saluskin Document pointed out the 
disproportionate method used to measure the costs and benefits of 
the Dalles Dam.9 The Dam benefited a few, but planners neglected 
to look at value the site had for the Native people. Celilo Falls, which 
b\ WRda\¶V VWaQdaUdV ZRXOd OLNeO\ be a UNESCO WRUOd HeULWage 
VLWe, ZaV cRQVLdeUed Whe ³WaOO SWUeeW Rf Whe WeVW´ fRU Whe SURVSeULW\ 
LW bURXghW WR VXUURXQdLQg NN¶V. 10 11 
On March 10, 1957, observers stood around Celilo Falls and 
watched the water trapped by the newly completed dam rising to 
drown the falls, silencing the previous roar, and destroying over one 
hXQdUed fLVhLQg SOaWfRUPV aQd ³dLS-QeW´ VWaWLRQV.12 Today only 
records remain of the names of hundreds of fishing spots 
extinguished by the Dalles Dam.13 The Bureau of Reclamation and 
the Corps of Engineers found that the ratio of benefits to cost for 
building the dam, even if the Native Americans caught the 
maximum amount of fish reasonable, was 1:22.14 Unlike traditional 
indigenous worldviews that consider connections between the 
physical world, social welfare, and spirituality when making 
decisions about how to use an environmental resource, Western law 
 
7 Id. 
8 1 William H. Rodgers & Elizabeth Burleson, Environmental Law in Indian 
Country 381 (2005).   
9 Id. 
10 Tom Base, Proposal To Resurrect Columbia River's Celilo Falls Draws Flak, 
NW NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 16, 2015), www.nwnewsnetwork.org/post/proposal-
resurrect-columbia-rivers-celilo-falls-draws-flak [https://perma.cc/46ZM-
UJU7]. 
11 Emily Alpert, Remembering Celilo Falls, THE DALLES CHRONICLE (July 10, 
2006), https://www.thedalleschronicle.com/news/remembering-celilo-
falls/article_f6ab05c0-5593-11e9-8a39-a340f9430234.html 
[https://perma.cc/T32T-UU3Z]. 
12 Rodgers, supra note 9, at 380.  
13 Id. at n.71. 
14 Id. at n.74. 
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and policy does not contemplate this relationship.15 The Saluskin 
Document points out that the federal government did not consider 
the cultural and religious significance of the Falls to the surrounding 
Native community when making a decision, only the economic 
gains of electric power from the dam.16 
This note examines harms caused to the environment greater 
than merely disrupting a natural balance that previously existed, 
specifically harms caused by noxious substances that are poisonous 
to the land. By nature, harms caused by toxic torts are particularly 
difficult to remediate adequately. A monetary number cannot 
sufficiently remediate damages to the health of an individual, their 
child, or the life of a loved one due to contact with hazardous 
substances that are not properly disposed of or stored. Essentially 
cUeaWLQg a ³VcRUched eaUWh´ effecW, Whese substances turn a once 
valuable natural resource into a toxic well²a permanently 
dangerous contamination of the land or water that people must avoid 
for their safety. 
When the federal government commits toxic torts on tribal 
lands by contaminating natural resources, NNs should be able to 
bring FTCA claims to obtain damages.  By creating the FTCA, the 
U.S. government waived its sovereign immunity to allow private 
citizens to obtain compensation when harmed by torts caused by the 
government.17 Although the jurisdiction to sue the federal 
government is broad, the FTCA is not without exceptions. One of 
the most consequential exceptions is the Discretionary Function 
Exception in § 2680(a) of the FTCA, which shields the government 
from liability when there is a policy choice involved. When the 
federal government assumes responsibility for an aspect of 
governance or policy on NNs by requiring BIA approval and 
controlling decisions in that aspect, there should be a carve-out 
within the discretionary function exception. The Trust Doctrine, 
combined with statutory requirements outlined in CERCLA and 
RCRA, along with the duties to conserve health outlined within the 
 
15 Robert A. Williams Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red Squirrel Pinatas, and 
Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multicultural 
World, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1133, 1164 (1994). 
16 Supra note 15. 
17 David S. Fishback, The Federal Tort Claims Act is a Very Limited Waiver of 
Sovereign Immunity ± So Long as Agencies Follow Their Own Rules and Do 
Not Simply Ignore Problems, 59 U.S. ATT¶YS¶ BULL. 16 (Jan. 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/02/03/usab5901.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K6VA-969T]. 
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Snyder Act, should overcome that exception, allowing NNs to bring 
successful FTCA claims. 
 
II. TOXIC HARMS AND TRIBES 
 
In the opening scene of the 1980 film Rambo: First Blood, 
S\OYeVWeU SWaOORQe¶V chaUacWeU JRhQ RaPbR, eageUO\ NQRcNV RQ Whe 
door of a house looking for his friend who served in Vietnam with 
hLP, RQO\ WR dLVcRYeU WhaW hLV bXdd\ ³GRW hLPVeOf NLOOed LQ µNaP... 
dLdQ¶W eYeQ NQRZ LW. CaQceU aWe hLP dRZQ WR Whe bRQe.´18 This scene 
was a reference to the toxic tort pollution Vietnam soldiers 
experienced that would later result in the 1984 Agent Orange 
settlement; at 180 million dollars, this was the largest settlement in 
history and led the way for mass toxic tort litigation.19 Toxic Tort 
claims are made when exposure to hazardous substances causes 
injury, and the victim of that injury seeks redress from the person 
who allegedly caused the exposure.20   
Generally speaking, a hazardous substance is an agent that 
causes death or health problems, including behavioral and genetic 
abnormalities, through direct or indirect contact.21 The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
LLabLOLW\ AcW (³CERCLA´) aOVR NQRZQ aV SXSeUfXQd, haV a PRUe 
 
18 Rambo: First Blood (1982) Movie Script, SPRINGFIELD! SPRINGFIELD!, 
https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/movie_script.php?movie=rambo-first-
blood [https://perma.cc/6AWH-SYDE] (last visited Apr. 10, 2018); There are 
many interesting parallels between Rambo: First Blood and the history of 
indigenous peoples in the United States. The character, Rambo, according to the 
second film is part Navajo. In the first movie, although he contributed greatly to 
the United States military efforts by serving in Vietnam as a Green Beret, he 
was harassed by U.S. law enforcement, who treated him with contempt. U.S. 
OaZ eQfRUcePeQW LQVWLgaWed aQ aggUeVVLYe VLWXaWLRQ, OeadLQg WR Whe ShUaVe, ³The\ 
dUeZ fLUVW bORRd, QRW Pe.´  
Likewise, indigenous people have routinely been victims of U.S. aggression. In 
spite of the great contributions made by indigenous people to national security 
interests of the United States by serving in the military at a higher percent than 
any other ethnic minority, and the specific contribution as wind talkers, a vital 
aspect in WWII, along with suffering radiation exposure to mine the uranium 
necessary to get ahead in the nuclear arms race, the U.S. legal system has failed 
to provide justice in return.  
19 Ralph Blumenthal, Veterans Accept $180 Million Pact on Agent Orange, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 8, 1984), www.nytimes.com/1984/05/08/nyregion/veterans-accept-
180-million-pact-on-agent-orange.html [https://perma.cc/M95Q-CFE4]. 
20 Anthony Z. Roisman, et. al., Preserving Justice: Defending Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
21 29 CFR § 1910.120. 
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exhaustive definition, including about 800 substances.22 This Act 
also allows for agencies to have the discretion to designate 
additional substances as a hazard when necessary.23  
Bringing a Toxic Tort claim against a citizen defendant can 
be difficult because plaintiffs must find evidence that establishes 
causation and find credible expert witness testimony that relies on 
published scientific studies.24 Plaintiffs bringing a case against the 
government must overcome additional threshold requirements to 
gain redress, making the process more complicated than against a 
private individual or entity. 
 
Tribes, Toxic Harms, Difficulties with Recovery 
 
The American West is known for its pristine national parks and 
is an increasingly popular tourist destination for those seeking 
outdoor activities such as hiking, rock climbing, and rafting.25 Still, 
little is known about how these same landscapes have also been 
desecrated in a way that directly effects the health of the 
communities who first lived there and continue to do so. This section 
tells the story of how the federal government directly contaminated 
two Native Nations in the Southwest and then considers possible 
means of redress. 
 
1. Navajo Nation Uranium 
 
In March 1979, the Three-Mile Island spill in Pennsylvania 
received national attention. The New York Times documented the 
chURQRORg\ Rf Whe ³QLghWPaUe,´ UefeUULQg WR LW aV Whe ³ZRUVW accLdeQW 
LQ Whe TXaUWeUဨceQWXU\ hLVWRU\ Rf WhLV cRXQWU\'V QXcOeaU SRZeU 
SURgUaP.´26 In July of that same year, the largest nuclear spill in U.S. 
 
22 42 U.S.C. § 6921, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7412, 15 U.S.C. § 2606. 
23 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (Westlaw current through P.L. 116).  
24 Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic 
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 
86 NW. U. L. REV. 643 (1992).  
25 Jenny Rowland Shea and Nicole Gentile, Outdoor Recreation Is Big Business, 
A State Scorecard and Policy Menu for Growing the Outdoor Recreation 
Economy in 11 Western States, Center for American Progress (September 27, 
2017) 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2017/09/27/439530/outd
oor-recreation-big-business/ [https://perma.cc/6K8Z-VKC4]. 
26 B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Three Mile Island: Notes From a Nightmare, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 16, 1979), www.nytimes.com/1979/04/16/archives/three-mile-
224 
 
history occurred at Church Rock, New Mexico.27 Over 1,100 tons 
of uranium tailings and approximately 100 million gallons of 
radioactive wastewater was dumped into the Rio Puerco River on 
the Navajo Nation when a mud dam failed.28 More than three 
months later, The NeZ YRUN TLPeV UeSRUWed ³NaYaMRV WRUU\ abRXW 
UUaQLXP PROOXWLRQ Rf RLYeU.´29 The outraged protestors and 
demonstrators reacting to the Three-Mile Island spill did not make 
an appearance for the Navajo people. 
The site was created decades ago, during the nuclear arms 
race, when the United States government was developing the 
Manhattan project. The majority of the United States uranium 
supply came from the southwest region of the country.30 During the 
era of the uranium boom, from the late 1940s to the 1970s, men in 
the local Navajo community were inclined to work in the mines 
because they were near to their homes, and there were few other 
RSWLRQV aYaLOabOe. AW Whe WLPe, ³UadLaWLRQ´ dLd QRW WUaQVOaWe LQWR Whe 
Navajo language.31 Being an isolated community with little 
knowledge about the hazards of the mining occupation, most of the 
people were unaware of the long-term health risks.32 By the late 
1930s, policymakers and scientist knew radon was hazardous.33In 
spite of the Treaty of 1868 between the Navajo Nation and the 
United States, forming a trust relationship where the Navajo Nation 
expected the United States to have their best interest, the United 
States did little to prevent the following public health crisis from 
radon exposure.34  
 
island-notes-from-a-nightmare-three-mile-island-a.html [https://perma.cc/8P7K-
DUF6]. 
27 Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation: 
Redressing the Legacy of Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and 
Native Lands, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 203, 217 (2015). 
28 Id. (citing Barbara Rose Johnson, Susan Dawson & Gary Madsen, Uranium 
Mining and Milling: Navajo experiences in the American Southwest, INDIANS 
AND ENERGY: EXPLOITATION AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 
111, 117 (Sherry Smith & Brian Frehner eds., 2010)). 
29 Navajos Worry About Uranium Pollution of River, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 
1979), www.nytimes.com/1979/11/18/archives/navajos-worry-about-uranium-
pollution-of-river.html [https://perma.cc/PPF2-RVTU]. 
30 Doug Brugge & Rob Goble, The History of Uranium Mining and the Navajo 
People, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 92 (2002), 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3222290/ [https://perma.cc/K28P-
ZWGJ]. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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2. San Carlos Apache Agent Orange 
 
In the 1960s and 70s, the United States Forest Service 
sprayed an herbicide containing dioxin called Silvex along the 
fifteen-mile portion of the Gila River running through the San 
Carlos Apache Reservation.35 Silvex is the name used in the U.S. for 
2,4,5-Trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, an insoluble substance used to 
destroy broad leaf plants by essentially interfering with the growth 
hormones vital to photosynthesis.36 This substance was combined in 
equal parts with 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid to create Agent 
Orange, used in the Vietnam War.37 According to the U.S. 
GeologLcaO SXUYe\ (³USGS´), Whe ReVeUYaWLRQ SRUWLRQ ZaV VeOecWed 
for efficiency purposes; permission from multiple landowners was 
not necessary for the project, only approval from the BIA.38 This 
action was part of an assignment called the Gila River Phreatophyte 
Project, which was created to reduce the vegetation believed to 
consume too much of the water necessary for the growing city of 
Phoenix.39 This vegetation included not only the invasive salt cedar 
species but also the native Phreatophyte, such as the local 
cottonwoods and black willows that benefit the flow of the river, 
protect the quality of water, and stabilize the banks.40 Unfortunately, 
Silvex destroyed both indiscriminately. 
 
35 Tanya H. Lee, Poisoned Lands: San Carlos Apache Indian Reservation 
Steeped in Dioxin, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/poisoned-lands-san-carlos-
apache-indian-reservation-steeped-in-dioxin-ICSCFZkJxEeNPCV0RdDthQ/ 
[https://perma.cc/5NJJ-F3MK]. 
36 U.S. National Library of Medicine, 2,4,5-Trichlorophenoxyacetic Acid, NAT¶L 
CENTER FOR BIOTECH. INFO. PUBCHEM COMPOUND DATABASE, 
www.pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/2_4_5-
trichlorophenoxyacetic_acid#section=Top [https://perma.cc/JK2J-63K9]. 
37 Jeanne M. Stellman and Steven D. Stellman, ³AgeQW OUaQge DXULQg Whe 
Vietnam War: The Lingering Issue 
Rf IWV CLYLOLaQ aQd MLOLWaU\ HeaOWh IPSacW,´ 108, n. 6 (June 2018). 
38 Supra note 36.  
39 R.C. Culler et. al., Objectives, Methods, and Environment-Gila River 
Phreatophyte Project, Graham County, Arizona, 655 A GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
PROF. PAPER (1970), https://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/0655a/report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7Q5K-TK99]. 
40 Pa. LaQd TUXVW AVV¶Q, The Science Behind the Need for Riparian Buffer 
Protection, CONSERVATIONTOOLS.ORG, http://conservationtools.org/guides/131-
the-science-behind-the-need-for-riparian-buffer-protection 
[https://perma.cc/Z94J-9W5N] (last visited November 15, 2019). 
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The Phreatophyte project did not only destroy the delicate 
and complicated riparian buffer zone but also left toxic 
contaminants.41 The San Carlos Apache believe that these 
cRQWaPLQaQWV haYe haUPed Whe cRPPXQLW\¶V heaOWh WR WhLV da\.42 
After decades of Agent Orange litigation, science shows that dioxins 
can cause major health problems such as birth defects and cancer.43 
In the neighboring town of Globe, Arizona, local non-Indian 
residents who had been sprayed by Agent Orange brought a class 
action suit against Dow Chemical and settled for an undisclosed 
amount in 1981.44 The class action arose when the United States 
Forest Service sprayed Kuron, a defoliant related to Agent Orange 
on the Pinal Mountains of the Tonto National Forest in an attempt 
to diminish foliage and increase water runoff between 1968 and 
1969.45  
Considering thaW Whe BXUeaX Rf IQdLaQ AffaLUV (³BIA´) 
approved the Phreatophyte program, there is a possibility that the 
Bureau and the U.S. forest services could be liable for failing to 
warn of the potential harms caused by dioxins. Although non-Indian 
residents of Globe were able to get compensation for harms resulting 
from Agent Orange, the United States, as a trustee of the San Carlos 
Apache, neglected to ensure that the residents of the reservation 
were safe from the spraying. If military victims of Agent Orange 
were able to find redress, as well as the Globe residents, surely there 
must be a route for compensation for the tribal members harmed by 
the same toxic substance.46 If the perpetrators who created the toxic 
tort situation on the San Carlos Apache Reservation or the Navajo 
Nation were a private company, the NNs would be able to sue them 
for exposure as private tortfeasor. Even though the FTCA was 
originally designed by Congress to provide a route for plaintiffs 
harmed by government tort actions, the obstacles here for tribes to 
gain compensation is the Discretionary Function Exception within 
the statute. The federal government has a heightened responsibility 
 
41 Supra note 38. 
42 Supra note 41. 
43 Richard Stone, AgenW Orange¶s BiWWer HarYesW, 315 SCIENCE 176 (Jan. 12, 
2007), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/315/5809/176 
[https://perma.cc/6BU3-8CYL].  
44 Herbicide Case in Arizona is Settle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1981), 
www.nytimes.com/1981/03/05/us/herbicide-case-in-arizona-is-settled.html 
[https://perma.cc/T9SH-DZW8]. 
45 Id. 
46 Supra notes 18, 38. 
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to tribes as opposed to the responsibilities of private companies, yet 
the DFE allows the government to have a stronger defense from 
liability than private tortfeasors. This note argues there are various 
legal regimes that create duties and obligations for the government. 
On their own, these regimes create limited remedies, and should be 
read together with the FTCA to allow Native Nations to obtain 
compensatory damages at least equal to what they could obtain from 
a private company. 
 
III. HOW TRIBES CAN RECOVER 
 
Keeping in mind the history of environmental degradation 
committed by the federal government on land assigned to the 
MXULVdLcWLRQ Rf NNV, WhLV VecWLRQ addUeVVeV hRZ NN¶V caQ SRWeQWLaOO\ 
recover monetary damages. Part A summarizes the Federal Tort 
Claims Act and explains why it is an important tool for NNs to use 
because of their unique status as quasi-sovereign nations within the 
United States. Part A then explains the exceptionally challenging 
burden of overcoming the Discretionary Function Exception. Part 
B(1) outlines first the way NNs have struggled to overcome the 
DFE, and then circumstances where Tribes have been able to 
overcome it. Part B(2) will distinguish these situations.  
 
A. Legal Barrier: The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 
 
1. FTCA Basics 
 
Because of the historical discriminatory treatment of Native 
Nations in respect to environmental torts, the FTCA is a valuable 
procedural tool for these nations to obtain remediation in and around 
Indian Lands. The discretionary function exception, which is 
discussed in this chapter, is a significant hurdle that must be 
overcome to gain compensation through this act. On account of the 
unique relationship between Native Nations and the federal 
government, courts should consider the duties of the government 
agency under the trust responsibility when analyzing whether the 
contested action falls under this exception. If the action does not fall 
under the exception, NNs can bring a successful FTCA claim. 
PULRU WR Whe FTCA¶V SaVVage LQ 1946, SULYaWe cLWL]eQV VeeNLQg 
redress for injury caused by federal government agencies or 
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employees had to lobby congress for private rights of action. 47  
Congress was inundated by private claims bills consuming much of 
the HRXVe¶V WLPe aQd bXdgeW Rf Whe bLOOV LQWURdXced aQd RQO\ a VPaOO 
percentage passed.48 B\ ZaLYLQg Whe UQLWed SWaWeV GRYeUQPeQW¶V 
Sovereign Immunity and conferring administrative settlement 
authority upon federal agencies and jurisdiction upon federal courts, 
the FTCA attempts to relieve Congress of the burden of creating 
private rights of action and provide justice to those who have been 
harmed by government negligence.49 
Section 2672 of the FTCA authorizes the head of any federal 
agency to settle claims cognizable under the FTCA and allows such 
agencies to use alternative dispute resolution methods. 28 U.S.C § 
2677 authorizes the United States Attorney General to arbitrate, 
cRPSURPLVe, RU VeWWOe WRUW cOaLPV. CRQgUeVV¶V bXUdeQ LV UeOLeYed b\ 
essentially substituting its duty to confer rights of action for private 
citizens to administrative agencies and the judicial system.50 
Under the FTCA, the United States is liable for torts in the 
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
similar circumstances.51 The primary difference, however, is that the 
United States cannot be held liable for interest prior to judgment or 
for punitive damages. In the case of death, where a state jurisdiction 
may only allow for punitive damages, the federal government shall 
be liable for actual or compensatory damages. 
Six conditions must be met in order to hold the United States 
liable under the FTCA.52 TheVe cRQdLWLRQV aUe: ³1) The cOaLP PXVW 
be against the United States; 2) The claim must be for monetary 
damages; 3) The damages claim must be for injury or damage to or 
loss of property, personal injury, or death; 4) The wrongful actor 
must be federal employee; 5) The wrongful actor was acting within 
 
47 David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to 
the Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 
291, 293 (1988-1989). 
48 H.R. 562, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (January 14, 1942); 88 Cong. Rec. 313-314 
(1942). 
49 State Farm Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 737, 738 (1st 
Cir. 1949) 
50  Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress to 
Accompany S. 2177, S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).  
51 28 U.S.C. § 2674 
52 Erin Murray Watkins, The Scope of Employment Requirement of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act: The Impropriety and Implications of the Montez Decision, and 
the Superior Jurisdictional Prima Facie Approach, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 533, 
538 (2009-2010). 
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the scope of his office or employment, and; 6) Under the 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where 
Whe acW RU RPLVVLRQ RccXUUed.´53  
To bring a FTCA claim, the plaintiff must be sure that the 
administrative remedies through the agency have been completely 
exhausted.54 The plaintiff must present an administrative tort claim 
to the appropriate government agency for adjudication before filing 
suit in federal court.55 
The fedeUaO gRYeUQPeQW¶V OLabLOLW\ LV deWeUPLQed b\ Whe OaZ 
of the state where the act or omission occurred.56 The federal 
gRYeUQPeQW'V OLabLOLW\ LV ³LQ Whe VaPe PaQQeU aQd WR Whe VaPe e[WeQW 
aV a SULYaWe LQdLYLdXaO XQdeU OLNe cLUcXPVWaQceV ...´57 and Premature 
claims are not actionable.58 
 
2. The Discretionary Function Exception 
 
The strongest defense against an FTCA claim is the 
Discretionary Function Exception (DFE). Exceptions to the FTCA 
LQcOXde ³[a]Q\ cOaLP . . . baVed XSRQ Whe e[eUcLVe RU SeUfRUPaQce RU 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on 
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, 
ZheWheU RU QRW Whe dLVcUeWLRQ LQYROYed be abXVed.´59 This means that 
even if the federal entity is abusing its discretion, it cannot be held 
OLabOe. The DFE ZaV deVLgQed WR ³SURWecW Whe GRYeUQPeQW fURP 
liability that would seriously handicap efficient government 
RSeUaWLRQV,´ aQd LW haV cRQWLQXed WR dR MXVW that.60  
The test for the Discretionary Function Exemption is 
announced in Berkovitz v. U.S., where a user who contracted polio 
 
53 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Westlaw current through P.L. 116-73).  
54 McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112-
113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993). 
55 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (Westlaw current through P.L. 116-73). 
56 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Westlaw current through P.L. 116-73); Richards v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). 
57 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Westlaw current through P.L. 116-73). 
58 Thompson v. United States, 215 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1954). 
59 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (Westlaw Current through P.L. 116-73). 
60 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1858, 10 L.Ed.2d 
805 (1963). 
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after using a polio vaccine sued the National Institute of Health.61 
The Supreme Court held that: 
 
 ³Whe OaQgXage, SXUSRVe, aQd OegLVOaWLYe hLVWRU\ Rf Whe 
discretionary function exception, as well as its 
interpretation in this Court's decisions, establish that 
the exception does not preclude liability for any and 
all acts arising out of federal agencies' regulatory 
programs, but insulates from liability only those 
governmental actions and decisions that involve an 
element of judgment or choice and that are based on 
SXbOLc SROLc\ cRQVLdeUaWLRQV.´62  
 
In Berkovitz, the Court first determined whether the action was a 
chRLce. ³[T]he dLVcUeWLRQaU\ fXQcWLRQ e[ceSWLRQ ZLOO QRW aSSO\ ZheQ 
a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a 
cRXUVe Rf acWLRQ fRU aQ ePSOR\ee WR fROORZ.´63 If there is no 
opportunity to choose, there is no discretion. When a government 
action is challenged under the FTCA, the court must consider 
whether the employee had to follow a specific course of action.64 
When policy, procedure, or the law compels an employee to choose 
a course of action based on their own judgement, not because of 
protocol, the first prong of the Berkovitz test is met.65 
Second, Berkovitz specifies that the discretionary choice 
PXVW be Whe NLQd WhaW Whe ³dLVcUeWLRQaU\ fXQcWLRQ e[ceSWLRQ ZaV 
deVLgQed WR VhLeOd.´66 The legislature created the discretionary 
fXQcWLRQ WR ³SUeYeQW MXdLcLaO µVecRQd-gXeVVLQg¶ Rf OegLVOaWLYe aQd 
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political 
SROLc\ WhURXgh Whe PedLXP Rf aQ acWLRQ LQ WRUW.´67 The decision 
further clarified, stating that courts should focus on whether the type 
of action taken is subject to a policy analysis by nature, not on the 
second prong of the Berkovitz WeVW RQ Whe ageQWV ³VXbMecWLYe LQWeQW.´ 
 
61Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531(19
88). 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 536. 
64 Id. at 542. 
65 Id. at 545. 
66 Id. at 536. 
67 Id. at 537. 
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68 The Supreme Court has held that regulatory activity by an agency 
falls within the DFE.69  
The DFE is a defense that has been used in ways that seem 
almost shocking in light of the facts. On September 26, 1950, a 
United States Navy ship began spraying a mysterious substance into 
the air roughly 2-miles from the Northern California Coast, near the 
thriving city of San Francisco.70 This was the beginning of a six-day 
e[eUcLVe, caOOed ³OSeUaWLRQ Sea-SSUa\´ b\ Whe U.S. PLOLWaU\ WR 
simulate and study the effects of germ warfare on a major city.71 The 
substance, also deposited along the Golden Gate Bridge, was a 
peculiar strain of bacteria called Serratia marcescens.72 At the time, 
the military believed the bacteria was harmless to humans, and it 
was ideal for tracing because it left bright red spots on foods it 
infected.73 This belief that it was harmless proved wrong a week 
after the test when eleven local residents checked in to Stanford 
University Hospital suffering from urinary tract infections.74 As 
doctors investigated, they discovered the source, a pathogen with a 
bright red hue, Serratia marcescens.75 Edward Nevin, recovering 
from prostate cancer, died from a bacterial heart infection a month 
after the Sea-Spray experiment.76 
After the experiment became public knowledge, his family 
brought an FTCA claim for wrongful death, claiming that he died 
becaXVe Rf Whe PLOLWaU\¶V acWLRQV LQ OSeUaWLRQ Sea-Spray.77 In this 
case, Nevin v. the United States, The Ninth Circuit held that the 
 
68 United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 104 S.Ct. 
2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984). 
69United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 111 S.Ct.1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991
). 
70 Helen Thompson, In 1950, the U.S. Released a Bioweapon in San Francisco, 
SMITHSONIAN INST. (July 6, 2015), www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-
news/1950-us-released-bioweapon-san-francisco-180955819/ 
[https://perma.cc/JM8X-YZU5]. 
71 Id. 
72 JXdge¶s Decision E[pecWed Soon in California Germ Warfare Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 15, 1981), www.nytimes.com/1981/04/15/us/judge-s-decision-
expected-soon-in-california-germ-warfre-case.html [https://perma.cc/5K8A-
DHZN]. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Richard P. Wheat et. al., Infection Due to Chromobacteria, AM. MED. ASS¶N. 
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. (Oct. 1, 1951), 
www.jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/555999 
[https://perma.cc/W77W-AWZE]. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at n. 73. 
232 
 
United States Government was protected from liability by the 
discretionary Function Exception.78  The Court considered whether 
the decision was made at a planning level, making it discretionary, 
and if judicial review would impair effective administration of 
government.79 Because the decision to use that particular strain of 
bacterium was made by the Chief Chemical Operator at the planning 
level, and the court not equipped to weigh the factors that led to the 
policy choice, the decision was protected by the discretionary 
function exception.80  
Although the previously decided case, Varig Airlines made 
it clear that it was the nature of the conduct, not the status of the 
actor, that determines whether or not the DFE applies, the 9th Circuit 
pointed out that the higher the rank of the official making the 
decision, the greater the likelihood policy implications are 
considered.81   
The Nevin caVe dLUecWO\ affecWV NN¶V abLOLWLeV WR VXcceVVfXOO\ 
bring an FTCA toxic tort case. In Begay v. United States, Navajo 
plaintiffs suffering from the Radiation exposure discussed above 
brought an FTCA claim, asserting that U.S. agencies were negligent 
because they failed to warn of radiation damage, and did not 
establish and enforce rigid safety standards.82 The plaintiffs also 
alleged that a study performed by the United States Public Health 
Service (PHS), looking for radiation exposure, was negligent 
because of failure to warn miners of possible radiation damage.83 
The 9th Circuit upheld the district court holding that creating and 
enforcing standards, as well as choosing not to warn participants in 
Whe PHS VWXd\ ZeUe ³baVed RQ MXdgePeQW´ aQd WheUefRUe 
discretionary.84 The court followed the logic of Nevin, holding that 
the PHS decision to not tell miners about health hazards for fear they 
would quit, resulting in interruption of uranium production, thus 
jeopardizing national security, was protected because high level 
government officials were making discretionary policy choices.85 
Even though the nature of the conduct is what determines if the 
discretionary function exception applies, the 9th Circuit has 
 
78 Nevin v. United States, 696 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1983). 
79 Id. at 1230. 
80 Id. at n. 79. 
81 Id.  
82 Begay v. U.S., 768 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1985). 
83 Id. at 1060. 
84 Id. at 1065-1066. 
85 Begay v. U.S., 591 F.Supp. 991, 1011 (1984). 
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affirmed with Nevin and Begay that the higher ranking the official 
is, and the level of national security impacts at stake heightens the 
likelihood that the DFE will apply. Clearly, the policy interest the 
cRXUW LV PRVW cRQceUQed ZLWh SURWecWLQg LV Whe fedeUaO gRYeUQPeQW¶V 
ability to make policy decisions that might sacrifice the lives and 
health of a minority for the sake of protecting the larger U.S. 
population. Yet such logic, when applied too generously, results in 
Korematsu type holdings that have not withstood the test of time.86  
From a practical perspective, advocates attempting to 
overcome the DFE must bolster arguments that the policy decision 
is non-discretionary, making clear distinctions from Begay and 
Nevin. To make such distinctions, advocates for native nations 
should argue that the official making the decision was not 
comparably high ranking and there was no national security interest 
considered. For example, in the case of the San Carlos Apache, the 
phreatophyte program was for the purpose of making the water flow 
more efficiently to the city of Phoenix, not to combat an outside 
threat. Advocates should not rely on such distinctions but recognize 
WhaW Whe\ aUe a facWRU LQ Whe cRXUW¶V decLVLRQ.  
 
Native Nations and the Discretionary Function Exemption 
 
1. How Native Nations have been able to overcome the 
DFE 
 
Although Begay VeUYeV aV aQ e[aPSOe Rf hRZ NN¶V haYe 
been hindered from recovering due to the DFE, there are 
cLUcXPVWaQceV ZheUe NN¶V RYeUcaPe Whe DFE WR VXcceVVfXOO\ bULQg 
FTCA claims in both the 9th Circuit and the D.C. Circuit. In the 9th 
Circuit case, the Court held that because the government had 
ZLdeVSUead cRQWURO RYeU Whe NN¶V ORggLQg acWLYLW\, Whe\ had a dXW\ 
to ensure basic safety measures. Although the government had 
discretion over granting the contract, the DFE did not shield the 
government from negligence. In the D.C. Circuit Case, the Court 
held that the DFE did not protect the actions of government agents 
acting outside the scope of their authority. Since Courts have 
aOORZed NN¶V WR ZLQ FTCA cOaLPV aQd cRQVLdeU Whe fLdXcLaU\ dXW\ 
of the government in these caVeV, NN¶V VhRXOd be abOe WR VXcceed 
bringing FTCA claims for toxic torts as well. Statutory duties that 
 
86 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2423, 201 L.Ed.2d 775 (2018). 
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prevent the government from committing toxic torts can be found in 
CERCLA and RCRA. As will be discussed later, because CERCLA 
is remedial, this moral duty combined with the statutory duties of 
CERCLA and RCRA should be enough to overcome the DFE to 
bULQg a FTCA cOaLP RQ behaOf Rf NN¶V. The fROORZLQg WZR caVeV, 
Marlys Bear Medicine and Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians are 
examples of when Native Nations have successfully brought FTCA 
claims and have been able to overcome the DFE.  
 
a. Marlys Bear Medicine v. U.S. ex rel. Secretary of Dept. 
of Interior 
 
In Marlys Bear Medicine,87 the Department of the Interior, 
through the BIA, had a responsibility under federal regulations and 
statutes to manage the forest and logging activities on the Blackfeet 
Reservation.88 The BIA authorized a contract between the NN and a 
logging company to do business on the reservation.89 In the contract 
there was a safety provision ensuring the right of the BIA to inspect 
and suspend the business operations if the company did not comply 
with the contract.90 Leland Kicking Woman, was fatally injured 
while working on the site for the logging company.91 Kicking 
WRPaQ¶V eVWaWe bURXghW aQ FTCA claim against the BIA for 
negligence.92  
The district court held that the DFE barred this claim but the 
9th Circuit reversed, saying that even though the DFE is designed to 
³aYRLd MXdLcLaO VecRQd gXeVVLQg´ LW LV QRW LQWeQded WR ³cUeaWe 
inconsistent liabilities between private and government employees 
SeUfRUPLQg LdeQWLcaO acWV.´93Although federal statute requires the 
BIA to consider factors such as economic impacts when authorizing 
timber sales on Indian Land held in trust, there is no instruction on 
how to weigh these factors, ultimately allowing the agency to have 
discretion.94 Because the statute leaves the agency with a choice, the 
decision to grant the contract with the logging company is protected 
 
87 Marlys Bear Medicine v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 241 F.3d 1208 (2001). 
88 Id. at 1211. 
89 Id. at 1212. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1211. 
92 Id.  
93 Supra note 88 at 1213.  
94 Id. at 1214. 
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by the DFE.95 On the other hand, failing to ensure safety even 
though the responsibility was assumed by the BIA in the contract is 
not protected by the DFE.96 The 9Wh CLUcXLW cRQcOXded WhaW ³[W]he 
Government cannot claim that both the decision to take safety 
measures and the negligent implementation of those measures are 
SURWecWed SROLc\ decLVLRQV.´97 If the government undertakes 
UeVSRQVLbLOLW\ fRU a SURMecW¶V VafeW\, Whe DFE caQQRW VhLeOd LWVeOf 
from liability for failing to fulfill the assumed requirement. 98 The 
9th Circuit also recognized that when a fiduciary duty exists, the 
United States has an obligation to act in the best interest of the 
beneficiary, in this instance, the Blackfeet Nation.99 Because the 
BIA haV ³SeUYaVLYe´ aQd ³cRPSUeheQVLYe´ cRQWURO RYeU Whe NaWLRQ¶V 
logging, it had a duty to ensure basic safety measures.100 
 
b. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States 
 
As the sun rose on May 19, 1979, a group of dissident Red 
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians seized several hostages on their 
reservation in an uprising protesting actions taken by the chairman 
of their Nation.101 After BIA and local law enforcement personnel 
contained the insurrection to one building, a single FBI agent, 
responding to a request for assistance, unilaterally ordered the 
withdrawal of all law enforcement from the premises.102 Although 
the hostages were eventually released, the NN claimed it suffered 
SURSeUW\ daPage fURP OaZ eQfRUcePeQWV¶ eYacXaWLRQ.   
The gRYeUQPeQW aUgXed WhaW Whe FBI ageQW¶V acWLRQV ZeUe 
protected by the DFE because he had a duty to act in favor of 
protecting human life, and the FBI had a policy to not assume a 
peace-keeping role on the Reservation.103 As established law found 
that government decisions are only protected by the DFE if they 
involve discretion and use policy considerations, Circuit Judge Bork 
UeaVRQed WhaW becaXVe ³a gRYeUQPeQW RffLcLaO haV QR dLVcUeWLRQ WR 
 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 1215. 
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1219.  
100 Id. at 1219-1220. 
101 Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. U.S., 800 F.2d 1187, 1187-88 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986). 
102 Id. at 1190. 
103 Id. at 1193. 
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violate the binding laws, regulations, or policies that define the 
e[WeQW Rf hLV RffLcLaO SRZeUV´ he caQQRW be XVLQg Whe W\Se Rf 
discretion the DFE was designed to protect when committing such 
violations.104 The gRYeUQPeQW¶V defeQVe cRXOd aSSO\ Lf Whe FBI ageQW 
had merely ordered other FBI agents to leave, but because the agent 
had ordered all law enforcement off the premises, and he did not 
have the authority to do so, he was acting outside the scope of his 
authority. Since he was acting outside the scope of his authority, his 
actions were not protected by the DFE.  
Here, if an agent of the BIA makes a decision that results in 
a toxic tort injury on a NN, then the NN, as a sovereign, should 
verify that the federal agent had the authority to do so. If there is no 
source of authority for the agent to permit such actions, then the 
ageQW¶V decLVLRQV caQQRW be SURWecWed b\ Whe DFE, aQd Whe NN 
should be able to bring a successful FTCA claim. 
When a federal agent has acted within the scope of their 
authority, a statutory duty is required in order to overcome the DFE.  
Such statutory duties to behave in a way that prevents the 
government from committing toxic torts can be found in CERCLA 
and RCRA. Because CERCLA is remedial and RCRA only allows 
for injunctive relief, these statutes alone are not enough to provide 
compensatory damages for tribes. The Indian Trust Doctrine creates 
a moral responsibility for the federal government to protect Native 
Nations. This moral duty combined with the statutory duties of 
CERCLA and RCRA should be enough to overcome the DFE to 
bring a FTCA claim on behalf of NNs. 
 
2. Path to Recovery: Finding a Non-Discretionary Function 
 
The Civil Rights Era brought forth a wave of environmental 
justice concerns grounded in the concept that access to clean air and 
water is a basic human right. Considering indigenous environmental 
justice in the same vein as the rest of other underrepresented groups 
is an oversimplification. Native Nations (NN) possess an advantage 
NQRZQ aV Whe ³WUXVW UeVSRQVLbLOLW\,´ eVWabOLVhed b\ Whe SXSUePe 
Court during the foundational years of the United States.   
 
 
 
 
104 Id. at 1197. 
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a. The Trust Doctrine 
 
The original rationale for the Indian Trust Doctrine was first 
outlined by Chief Justice John Marshall in Cherokee v. Georgia, 
ZheUe he defLQed NN¶V aV ³dRPeVWLc deSeQdeQW QaWLRQV.´105 
Marshall noted that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
contained a recognition of the soveUeLgQW\ Rf NN¶V aQd ³WheLU 
exclusive right to give and to execute the law within that 
bRXQdaU\.´106 In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall further explained 
Whe UeOaWLRQVhLS, VWaWLQg WhaW Whe VWaWXV Rf NN¶V aV ³WhaW Rf a QaWLRQ 
claiming and receiving the protecWLRQ Rf RQe PRUe SRZeUfXO,´ ZhLOe 
they maintained their national character and right to govern 
internally.107 Chief Justice Marshall derived this framework from 
the express and implied terms in the treaty relationship between the 
NN¶V aQd Whe UQLWed SWaWeV Government, which can be referred to 
as a sacred trust.108 Because of this framework, the United States 
had a duty to protect the rights of the Cherokee Nation.109 In the 
following cases, the Courts have found that this responsibility of the 
UQLWed SWaWeV WR NN¶V LV bLQdLQg.  
Under the Trust Doctrine, the United SWaWeV ³haV chaUged 
itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. 
Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in 
dealings with the Indians, should, therefore, be judged by the most 
e[acWLQg fLdXcLaU\ VWaQdaUdV.´110 Although the moral responsibility 
the United States holds because of the Trust Doctrine has been 
beQefLcLaO WR NN¶V, Whe SXSUePe CRXUW haV aOVR LQWeUSUeWed Whe TUXVW 
DRcWULQe WR XShROd fedeUaO SRZeU RYeU NN¶V.111 Because the Trust 
DRcWULQe UefeUV WR WheLU ³deSeQdeQW´ QaWXUe, Whe SXSUePe CRXUW 
found that it was a source of congressional power to unilaterally 
abURgaWe a WUeaW\ ZheQ QeceVVaU\ WR ³SURWecW´ NN¶V.112 The power 
 
105 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831). 
106 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 7.  
107 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 555 (1832). 
108 Robert A. Jr. Williams, People of the States Where They Are Found Are 
Often Their Deadliest Enemies: The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights 
and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 981 at 996 (1996). 
109 Id.  
110 Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942). 
111 Rebecca Tsosie, Conflict Between the Public Trust and the Indian Trust 
Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Indians, 39 TULSA L. REV. 
271, at 275 (2003).  
112 Id.  
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of Congress to unilaterally abrogate treatieV LV NQRZQ aV ³POeQaU\ 
PRZeU.´ 113 In United States v. Kagama, the Supreme Court utilized 
Whe TUXVW DRcWULQe WR cRQfLUP CRQgUeVV¶V abLOLW\ WR eQacW Whe MaMRU 
Crimes Act, abrogating treaty rights to allow federal jurisdiction 
over Indian on Indian crimes, where the federal government had no 
jurisdiction before.114  
In addition to the Trust Doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
XVed Whe CRPPeUce COaXVe Rf Whe CRQVWLWXWLRQ aQd CRQgUeVV¶V 
power to make laws to enforce and execute treaties to reinforce 
CRQgUeVV¶V POeQaUy Power over Indian affairs.115 This plenary power 
extrapolated from the Trust Doctrine is in direct conflict with the 
understanding of the trust doctrine as a way to limit federal actions 
that infringe on the sovereignty of Native Nations to govern internal 
affairs.116 In later cases, such as Seminole v. United States, the 
Supreme Court found that the Trust Doctrine provides that the 
United States uphold treaty obligations with the level of 
responsibility a private fiduciary would owe an individual whose 
assets they were responsible for managing.117  
With the contemporary understanding of the Trust Doctrine, 
there are three different levels of duty the federal government is 
responsible for ensuring to Native Nations.118 These can be 
described as a general trust SULQcLSOe, a ³OLPLWed´ WUXVW UeVSRQVLbLOLW\, 
and a full fiduciary relationship.119  
The first is the general trust principle, which is used when 
there are no specific statutes that create distinct federal duties for the 
goal of the statute.120 This general trust principle is one that 
UecRgQL]eV Whe gRYeUQPeQW¶V RbOLgaWLRQ WR SURWecW NaWLYe NaWLRQV. 
Although not consistently used, the general trust principle provides 
a valuable canon of construction for courts to apply when 
interpreting legal duties. Because the general trust principle is not 
 
113 Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in 
Indian Affairs, 63 UCLA L. Rଽୖ. 666, 679 (2016).  
114 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886). 
115 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TULANE L. 
REV. 509, at 521-522 (2007). 
116 Tsosie, supra note 114, at 275.  
117 Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297. 
118 Tsosie, supra note 114, at 276. 
119 Id. at 276, 277. 
120 Id. at 276 
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completely enforceable by courts, it is considered to be a broad 
³PRUaO RbOLgaWLRQ.´121  
Under a limited trust responsibility, the government has 
enacted broad statutes containing duties necessary to fulfill the 
purpose of the legislation. If the federal government fails to meet the 
statutory obligation of performing the required duties, Native 
NaWLRQV Pa\ VXe fRU ³decOaUaWRU\ RU LQMXQcWLYe UeOLef WR cRPSeO 
SeUfRUPaQce.´122 WLWh WhLV OeYeO Rf WUXVW UeVSRQVLbLOLW\, NN¶V aUe Qot 
entitled to compensatory damages.  
The hLgheVW OeYeO Rf WUXVW UeVSRQVLbLOLW\ eQWLWOeV NN¶V WR 
compensatory damages. According to United States v. Mitchell 
(³Mitchell II´), a fLdXcLaU\ UeOaWLRQVhLS LV fRXQd ZheUe Whe UQLWed 
States, through statutes and regulations, created duties and standards 
particularly designed to financially benefit Native people. The court 
found that the relationship came from the language in statutes that 
expressly supports a financial responsibility by the government, as 
well as the extent that the government controls the assets. The court 
said that if the fiduciary language was not there when the 
government took elaborate control over tribal monies or property, a 
fiduciary trust relationship necessarily exists.123 Although though 
the case in Mitchell II addressed a situation where statutes specified 
duties of the federal government to manage timber assets in a way 
that considered financial goals for Native People, the decision 
suggested that even without such statutory language, when the 
government has extensive control of a property, there is a fiduciary 
duty. To get monetary compensation from the government for the 
bUeach Rf a fLdXcLaU\ dXW\, NN¶V PXVW be abOe WR LdeQWLf\ a 
substantive source of law that mandates specific duties.  
The highest level of trust responsibility should be implicated 
when the BIA, which should comply with CERCLA and RCRA, 
fails to do so and causes harm to the health of Native American 
communities. Although these are general statutes, the Snyder Act, 
as interpreted by the 8th Circuit in Blue Legs v. EPA, creates an 
absolute duty. If the Snyder Act creates an absolute duty for the BIA 
to expend money to comply with federal hazardous waste 
regulations, then it could potentially be used to overcome the DFE.  
 
121 Id. 
122 Supra note 121.Rebecca Tsosie, Conflict Between the Public Trust and the 
Indian Trust Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Indians, 39 
TULSA L. REV. 271, 276. 
123 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983). 
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b. The Snyder Act 
 
For cases involving the BIA, the Snyder Act can create a 
duty for the BIA to comply with RCRA, and potentially 
CERCLA.124 Under 25 U.S.C.A. §13, the BIA can expend money as 
aSSURSULaWe fURP WLPe WR WLPe, aV CRQgUeVV caQ, ³fRU Whe beQefLW, 
caUe, aQd aVVLVWaQce Rf IQdLaQV WhURXghRXW Whe UQLWed SWaWeV´ fRU 
VSecLfLc SXUSRVeV OLVWed LQ Whe acW. (CLWaWLRQ) ³FRU UeOLef Rf dLVWUeVV 
aQd cRQVeUYaWLRQ Rf heaOWh´ LV Whe PRVW UeOeYaQW SXUSRVe OLVWed fRU 
Whe gRaO Rf WhLV NRWe becaXVe ha]aUdRXV VXbVWaQceV RQ NN¶V OaQd LV 
highly threatening to the health and wellbeing of Native 
communities. (citation) 
The 9th Circuit held that programs administered for the 
benefit of Indians under the Snyder Act must be liberally construed 
in their favor.125 In Blue Legs v. EPA, as later discussed, the 8th 
Circuit found that when the BIA creates an injury that harms the 
health of the community it had a duty to take care of, the Snyder Act 
obligates the BIA to remedy that injury, beyond the proportion of 
the harm the BIA caused.126 Potentially then, when the BIA 
approved Silvex to be sprayed on the San Carlos Apache 
ReVeUYaWLRQ, Whe AgeQc\ Pa\ haYe aQ ³abVROXWe´ duty to relieve 
stress and conserve the health of that community.127 Snyder is 
important to keep in mind because it could be used to argue that the 
BIA had a mandatory duty to relieve the distress on a reservation for 
health purposes, and used to overcome the DFE in an FTCA claim.  
 
CERCLA and RCRA: Limited, But Helpful 
 
On its surface, if analyzed in a vacuum without any historical 
or social context, the trust responsibility appears to be a sufficient 
legal doctrine that would prevent the federal government from 
committing outrageous toxic torts on Native land, or at a minimum 
aOORZ UedUeVV fRU NN¶V WhaW haYe beeQ LQMXUed b\ Whe fedeUaO 
gRYeUQPeQW. AfWeU aOO, Whe facW WhaW Whe UQLWed SWaWeV haV ³XQdeU a 
 
124 Mark J. Connot, Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs: An 
Expansion of BIA Duties under the Snyder Act, 36 S.D. L. REV. 382, 399 
(1991). 
125 Fox v. Morton, 505 F.2d 254, 255 (1974).  
126 Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1100 
(8th Cir. 1989). 
127 Id.  
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humane and self-imposed policy«charged itself with moral 
RbOLgaWLRQV Rf Whe hLgheVW UeVSRQVLbLOLW\ aQd WUXVW,´ VeQVLbO\ cRXOd 
be VRPeWhLQg WhaW bRWh ³RUdLQaU\ PeaQLQg´ We[WXaOLVWV aQd OLbeUaO 
progressive members on the court and in politics agree on.128 The 
actuality is that the courts in the modern era have failed to uphold 
the federal-tribal trust relationship consistently.129 
Finding a mandatory duty is fundamental to overcoming the 
DFE.130 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, the court reviewed 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and followed 
WUadLWLRQaO MXULVSUXdeQce, VWaWLQg ³a VWaWXWe, UegXOaWLRQ, RU SROLc\ 
leaves it to a federal agency or employee to determine when and 
how to take action, the agency is not bound to act in a particular 
manner and the exercise of its authority is discretionar\.´131 To 
RYeUcRPe Whe DFE, NN¶V PXVW ORRN fRU VWaWXWeV, UegXOaWLRQV, aQd 
policies that are mandatory. For example, some statutes outline how 
Native Nations specifically are to be treated regarding regulation 
and will be discussed below. 
Several federal environmental laws allow the EPA to treat 
NN¶V aV VWaWeV (TAS) WR LPSOePeQW eQYLURQPeQWaO SURgUaPV. The 
OaZV WhaW e[SUeVVO\ deVLgQaWe NN¶V TAS VWaWXV aUe Whe COeaQ ALU AcW 
(CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), and Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA).132 Although the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 
and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
(EPCRA) dR QRW PeQWLRQ NN¶V, Whe EPA WhURXgh ageQc\ 
adjudication has determined that these acts allow tribal 
participation.133  NN¶V aUe WUeaWed aV VWaWeV RQO\ LQ UegaUds to 
response-related functions, including notification of releases, 
consultation on remedial action, access to information, and roles and 
responsibilities under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) and the 
 
128 Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 286 (1942). 
129 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, 
40 HUMAN RIGHTS MAG 4 (Oct. 1, 2014), available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_
home/2014_vol_40/vol--40--no--1--tribal-
sovereignty/short_history_of_indian_law/ [https://perma.cc/KP77-VL5Y], 
(Citing United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) and United States 
v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011)). 
130 Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1180±81 (9th Cir. 2005). 
131 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, (quoting United States v. 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991)). 
132 Tribal Assumption of Federal Laws - Treatment as a State (TAS), EPA 
Environmental Protection Agency, (Jan. 17, 2018), www.epa.gov/tribal/tribal-
assumption-federal-laws-treatment-state-tas [https://perma.cc/68LH-GZDD]. 
133 Id.  
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Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA).134 The Resource Conservation and 
RecRYeU\ AcW, (RCRA), hRZeYeU, dReV QRW aOORZ NN¶V WR be WUeaWed 
aV VWaWeV, SUeYeQWLQg NN¶V fURP e[eUcLVLQg WheLU VRYeUeLgQW\ WR 
implement their own hazardous waste programs. Through RCRA, 
the federal government maintains substantial involvement over 
managing tribal land and natural resources.  
 
1. CERCLA 
 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as the 
Superfund, was enacted in 1980 to manage the release of hazardous 
substances. The Act is a federal government program run in 
conjunction with the states to remediate and clean up hazardous 
materials.135 To repair harmful conditions caused by improper 
disposal of poisonous chemicals, CERCLA holds the parties 
responsible for the situation accountable, requiring them to be liable 
for cost and cleanup.136 The government is not liable for 
compensatory damages through CERCLA. While CERCLA is 
remedial and designed to correct past harms, RCRA is preventive, 
designed to address present and potential threats.137  
 
2. How Indian Nations have used CERCLA 
 
CERCLA provides only enough funds to care for the cost of 
cleaning up a site, not for torts resulting from the hazardous 
substances found within. Considering the vast amounts of harms 
these sites create to the health of local communities, CERCLA alone 
LV QRW adeTXaWe WR addUeVV LQMXU\ WR NN¶V. The fROORZLQg caVeV 
illustrate how Native Nations have been able to use CERCLA and 
RCRA to their advantage, but the solution is insufficient.  
 
 
134 Tribal Land Cleanup Laws and Regulations, Environmental Protection 
Agency (May 19, 2017), www.epa.gov/tribal-lands/tribal-land-cleanup-laws-
and-regulations [https://perma.cc/8BH8-ZSVZ]. 
135 Karen A. Gottlieb, Toxic Torts Practice Guide, Spring 2017 Edition. 
136 U.S. v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 200 F.3d 143, 148 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
137 S.C. DeS¶W Rf HeaOWh & EQYWO. CRQWURO Y. CRPPeUce & IQdXV. IQV., 372 F.3d 
245, 251 (4th Cir. 2004).  
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a. The YaNaPa (³A GURZLQg FaPLO\´)  
 
The Yakama Nation is surrounded on three sides by 
Superfund sites. To the east is the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, 
north is the Holden Mine site on Lake Chelan, and south are the 
Bradford Island, Harbor Oil in North Portland, and Portland Harbor. 
According to the Treaty of 1855, the Yakama Nation has dominion 
over the territories in Oregon and Washington, guaranteeing rights 
over ceded land even if the lands are not part of the reservation.  
The Hanford Nuclear Reservation was established in the 
1940s to produce the plutonium that was used in the first nuclear 
bomb, and today it is the most contaminated nuclear site in the 
United States.138 Daily, the site poisons groundwater and the toxic 
liquid is actively leaking into the Columbia River.139 Because the 
Nation secured fishing rights in 1855 to fish local rivers, 
contamination in the Columbia River is a major impediment to their 
subsistence.140 The EPA currently has an advisory against eating 
fish from a heavily polluted ten-mile stretch of water, and adequate 
cleanup is necessary to ensure the Yakama have healthy fish to feed 
their families.141  
The Yakama recently won a judgment in the District Court 
of Oregon to recover the costs spent on containing the contamination 
at the Bradford Island site. The court found that under CERCLA, the 
YaNaPa LV eQWLWOed WR UecRYeU ³aOO cRVWV Rf UePRYaO RU UePedLal 
action incurred by the . . . Indian tribe not inconsistent with the 
 
138 Walter Pincis, The Explosive Cost of Disposing of Nuclear Weapons, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (July 3, 2013), www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/the-explosive-cost-of-disposing-of-nuclear-
weapons/2013/07/03/64f896e0-e287-11e2-80eb-
3145e2994a55_story.html?utm_term=.5a24c21466dd [https://perma.cc/794C-
N8NP]. 
139 Karina Brown, Surrounding Nuclear Site, a Natural Treasure Under 
Fire, Homepage COURTHOUSE NEWS (June 28, 2017), 
www.courthousenews.com/surrounding-nuclear-site-natural-treasure-fire/ 
[https://perma.cc/2529-5NEB]. 
140 Ericka Cruz Guevarra, Yakama Nation Demands Accountability f For 
Columbia River Sewage Spills, OR. PUB.  BROAD. (2017), 
www.opb.org/news/article/columbia-river-sewage-spill-yakama-nation-salmon/ 
[https://perma.cc/WQX3-B7PU]. 
141 Steve Law, Yakama Nation Demands More Rigorous Cleanup of Superfund 
Site in Portland Harbor, Pamplin Media Group (Jul. 25, 2016), 
https://pamplinmedia.com/sl/316234-195510-yakama-nation-demands-more-
rigorous-cleanup-of-superfund-site-in-portland-harbor- [https://perma.cc/R9YA-
QD3N]. 
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QaWLRQaO cRQWLQgeQc\ SOaQ.´142 
The Yakama Nation has spent vast sums of money defending 
their reserved fishing rights first acquired under the Treaty of 1855. 
After securing their fishing rights, they have been compelled to 
protect their subsistence by responding to the hazardous substances 
leaking into the Columbia River where the fish live. The Yakama 
has spent resources monitoring, assessing, and evaluating the 
³UeOeaVeV Rf ha]aUdRXV VXbstances and potential impact on the 
eQYLURQPeQW, aQd WR Whe heaOWh aQd ZeOfaUe Rf WULbaO PePbeUV.´ The 
Yakama organized these actions to mitigate damage to the 
environment, actions that did not just benefit them, but also the non-
Indian communities surrounding. 
The United States has admitted to disposing of hazardous 
wastes in and around the Bradford Island site and directly into the 
Columbia River. The Yakama has incurred $99,798.32, verified and 
documented, for response actions to this contamination.143 Because 
Whe YaNaPa¶V acWLRQV ZeUe cRQVLVWeQW ZLWh a NaWLRQaO CRQWLQgeQc\ 
Plan (NCP), they are entitled to recover the verified and documented 
expenses they incurred reacting to the hazardous wastes leaks under 
CERCLA § 9607(a)(4)(A), with interest.144 There is no mention in 
this case, however, of the Yakama recovering damages for the fish 
UeVRXUceV Whe\ ORVW aV a UeVXOW Rf Whe gRYeUQPeQW¶V acWLRQ.  
 
b. Navajo Nation 
 
  In El Paso Natural Gas Co. LLC v. United States, the United 
States argued that it was not liable for cleaning up a mine site 
because they have Sovereign Immunity and only own Fee Title of 
the Navajo Reservation.145 Because their ownership interest is 
limited to holding the land in trust for the Navajo, they argued that 
they were not culpable because they were not the owner. The Circuit 
 
142 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
143 Yakama Motion for Summary Judgment, Turtle Talk, 
turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/20-yakama-motion-for-summary-j.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S82X-VYJZ]. 
144 Yakama Nation v. United States, No. 3:14-CV-01963, 2016 WL 406344 (D. 
Or. Feb. 1, 2016). 
145 Supplemental Brief for El Paso Nat. Gas Co. at 3, El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. 
United States, No. 3:14-cv-081650-PCT-DGC, 2017 WL 2405266 (D. Ariz. 
June 2, 2016), available at https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2017/08/16/federal-
court-holds-us-govt-is-owner-of-indian-trust-land-under-cercla-for-liability-
purposes  [https://perma.cc/AUR3-PQLK]. 
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Court disagreed and held that the United States waived its Sovereign 
Immunity to the extent it is liable under CERCLA and ordered more 
briefing from both the United States and the El Paso regarding who 
the land on the reservation within the meaning of the statute. After 
additional briefing, the Court found that although the Navajo Nation 
has substantial property interests, since the Navajo Nation cannot 
exclude the United States government from the reservation, and 
does not hold the power to supervise, alienate, and abrogate, it is not 
responsible for mine cleanup under CERCLA. As the fee titleholder, 
ZLWh Whe SRZeU WR ³eQWeU, cRQWURO aOLeQaWLRQ, aQd WaNe,´ Whe UQLWed 
States is the owner under the purposes of CERCLA, and is 
responsible for the costs of cleaning up the mine site.146 The Court 
decided not to determine at this time if the United States can limit 
the amount they are liable based on their fiduciary role. 
 
3. RCRA 
 
 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, RCRA is a 
cRPSUeheQVLYe UegXOaWRU\ VchePe WR gRYeUQ Whe ³WUeaWPeQW, VWRUage, 
aQd dLVSRVaO Rf ha]aUdRXV ZaVWeV.´147 creates a right of action for 
citizens harmed by the federal government in three instances. The 
first is enforcing violations of permit standards or regulations, 
second, by abating imminent and substantial endangerments to 
health or the environment, and third, by forcing the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to perform a nondiscretionary duty.148  
In reality, RCRA is the common name for a 1967 
amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. In Subtitle C, 
RCRA outlines the hazardous waste management program, while 
Subtitle D defines the solid waste management program.149 As 
Subtitle C is currently written, the EPA directly implements 
hazardous waste programs, regulating the production, 
transportation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste in Indian 
 
146 Id. at 9. 
147 Environmental Defense Fund v. E.P.A., 852 F.2d 1316, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 
1988).  
148 Ricky Nelson, Covert RCRA Enforcement: Seeking Compensatory Damages 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for Environmental Regulation, 42 ENVTL. L. 
909, at 911-912 (2012). 
149 Id. 
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Country.150 If the EPA administrator deems it appropriate for the 
hazardous waste program, he or she is authorized to enter into an 
aVVLVWaQce agUeePeQW ZLWh IN¶V XQdeU 42 U.S.C.  6908a. RCRA LV 
limited in its ability to benefit tribes because it does not provide 
compensatory damages the same way an FTCA claim might, but 
only allows for injunctive relief.  
 
a. HRZ NN¶V haYe XVed RCRA 
 
In Blue Legs v. United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, the estate of private citizen and enrolled member of the 
Oglala Sioux Nation, Maddie Blue Legs, brought a claim under 
RCRA seeking an injunction to end the improper maintenance of 
dumpsites on the Reservation by the Environmental Protection 
AgeQc\ (³EPA´), Whe BIA, IQdLaQ HeaOWh SeUYLceV (³IHS´), aQd 
Oglala Sioux Nation. The district court recognized that the NN had 
a responsibility to comply with standards for open dumping of solid 
waste. Under RCRA, the NN has the same authority to implement a 
solid waste program as a municipality.151 Because hazardous 
substances can cause more harm, there are heightened regulations 
regarding the management of hazardous waste, therefore the EPA 
haV ³cRQgUeVVLRQaOO\ [cRQfeUUed] aXWhRULW\´ RYeU ha]aUdRXV 
waste.152  
Importantly, the BIA and IHS argued that RCRA did not 
obligate them to participate in compliance efforts.153 By 
administering facilities that dispose of hazardous and solid wastes, 
both the IHS and BIA supervise activities the RCRA regulates.154 
Because IHS and the BIA administer programs that deal with the 
disposal of substances RCRA is meant to govern, the court held they 
had to comply with RCRA standards.155 Additionally, the court 
found that the Snyder Act, which directs the BIA to expend 
aSSURSULaWed fXQdV fRU ³Whe UeOLef Rf dLVWUeVV aQd Whe cRQVeUYaWLRQ Rf 
heaOWh,´ LPSRVeV affLUPaWLYe dXWLeV WhaW Whe BIA NQRZLQgO\ YLROaWed 
 
150 Fred E. Breedlove, Implementing the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) in Indian Country and Approaches for Amending RCRA to Better 
Serve Tribal Interests, 26 VT. L. REV. 881, 894 (2002). 
151 Blue Legs v. U.S. E.P.A., 668 F. Supp. 1329, 1338 (D. S.D. 1987), aff¶d sXb 
nom. Blue Legs v. BIA, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989). 
152 Blue Legs, 668 F. Supp. at 1339. 
153 Id. at 1098. 
154 Id. at 1099. 
155 Id. 
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in its management of hazardous substances on the reservation.156  
Although the BIA has some discretion over how to use allocated 
funds, when the agency causes harm for the beneficiaries of the 
Snyder Act, it has an absolute obligation to remedy the wrong.157 
This duty extends beyond the proportion of the harm caused by the 
BIA. Blue Legs leaves open the possibility that RCRA could be 
interpreted to create a full fiduciary duty since the government has 
full comprehensive control over hazardous waste that by nature 
affecWV NN¶V QaWXUaO UeVRXUceV.  
 
b. Common Principles Between the Indian Trust 
Doctrine and FTCA 
 
The Indian Trust Doctrine is a valuable concept for Native 
Nations because it sets forth duties required by the federal 
government. Although the Indian Trust Doctrine is helpful, it is 
limited. The problem is that in spite of the potential to benefit tribes, 
Courts have not consistently applied the doctrine. Although the 
doctrine created a fiduciary duty for the federal government to 
manage a historic site in White Mountain Apache v. United States 
baVed RQ a 1960¶V act, the same doctrine did not find a statutory duty 
from the Navajo±Hopi Rehabilitation Act for the Navajo to invoke 
in the face of evidence of corruption by the Secretary of the 
Interior.158 Such discrepancies feed the perception in Indian Country 
that the Indian Trust Doctrine is not a cause of action that can be 
UeOLed XSRQ LQ cRXUW. TheUefRUe, NN¶V VeeNLQg cRPSeQVaWLRQ cRXOd 
have greater success in bringing an FTCA claim than a breach of 
trust action. The Trust Doctrine should still be used by courts 
adjXdLcaWLQg FTCA cOaLPV bURXghW b\ NN¶V WR LQWeUSUeW VWaWXWeV 
favorably for tribes to find a statutory duty, overcoming the DFE.    
 
156 Id. at 1100; 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1998). 
157 Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1100 (citing Morton citing Cf., Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 94 
S.Ct. 1055, 1075, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)) (BIA must act consistently with their 
trust obligations); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 
252, 256±257 (D.C. Cir.1973) (Secretary of the Interior must administer 
Reclamation statutes as to minimize adverse impact on Indian Reservations). 
See also, White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 555 (S.D. 1977) aff'd 581 F.2d 
697 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (IHS must provide care where state cannot). 
158 88 Act of Mar. 18, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86±392, 74 Stat. 8 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 277 (2000)1960 Act); United States v. Navajo Nation II, 556 U.S. 287, 
299 (2009). 
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IQ Whe hLVWRU\ Rf fedeUaO IQdLaQ LaZ, NN¶V haYe had WR 
overcome major obstacles to hold the government accountable for 
damages caused by actions or failure to act by U.S. agents who were 
responsible for ensuring the wellbeing of the NN. According to 
Mitchell II, for a plaintiff Nation to gain monetary reparations, it 
PXVW fLQd a VRXUce Rf OegLVOaWLRQ WhaW ³caQ faLUO\ be LQWeUSUeWed as 
mandating compensation by the federal government for the damages 
VXVWaLQed.´159 In Navajo Nation v. United States, the NN sued the 
SecUeWaU\ Rf Whe IQWeULRU fRU faLOLQg WR acW LQ Whe NaYaMR NaWLRQ¶V beVW 
interest.160 The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) assigns 
responsibility to the Secretary of the Interior to approve leasing 
agUeePeQWV beWZeeQ Whe IN¶V aQd SULYaWe cRPSaQLeV.161 When the 
Navajo Nation attempted to negotiate a leasing rate of 20 percent of 
gross proceeds, Peabody coal directly contacted the Secretary of the 
Interior.162 After meeting with representatives from Peabody coal, 
the Secretary of the Interior then postponed his approval of the lease, 
and told parties to reconsider. Ultimately, he approved a lease for 
only 12 percent of gross proceeds.163 The Navajo Nation then sued, 
cOaLPLQg WhaW WhLV ZaV a bUeach Rf Whe SecUeWaU\¶V dXW\ WR acW LQ Whe 
NaWLRQ¶V beVW LQWeUeVW.164  
Despite the Trust Doctrine, the Supreme Court held that 
because the IMLA does not create a comprehensive regulatory 
regime, it is not substantive law, therefore it cannot be used to 
LPSRVe a fLdXcLaU\ dXW\ RQ Whe fedeUaO gRYeUQPeQW WR acW LQ IN¶V beVW 
interest.165 This reasoning is akin to the DFE, where unless plaintiffs 
can find substantive law that leaves no room for discretion, the 
United States cannot be held liable for a tort.  
The Supreme Court in Berkovitz stated that the DFE does not 
aSSO\ ZheQ WheUe LV ³a fedeUaO VWaWXWe, UegXOaWLRQ, RU SROLc\ 
specifically prescribes a courVe Rf acWLRQ.´166 In White Mountain 
Apache Tribe v. United States, the Nation sued the United States for 
failing to fulfill its obligations to manage and care for a historic 
PLOLWaU\ VLWe RQ Whe NN¶V OaQd. Congress, in 1960, had specified that 
Whe VLWe be ³held by the United States in trust for the White Mountain 
 
159 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 218. 
160 Navajo Nation v. United States, 537 U.S. 488, 493 (2003). 
161 Id.  
162 Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 497 (2003). 
163 Id. at 488. 
164 Id. at 489. 
165 Id. at 507. 
166 Berkovitz v. U.S., 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). 
249 
 
Apache Tribe, subject to the right of the Secretary of the Interior to 
use any part of the land and improvements for administrative or 
school purposes for as long as they are needed for the purpose.´167 
There was no dispute that the Secretary utilized that right and that 
the government occupied the property, creating at the minimum a 
plenary control over the property equivalent to the control exercised 
by the United States in Mitchell II.168 Because there was statutory 
language outlining that the United States would keep the property in 
trust, the court found that the government had a duty. Since the U.S. 
government allowed the historic site to fall into disrepair in spite of 
the legislation, the White Mountain Apache was able to sue the 
government for monetary damages. Although the Berkovitz test is 
arguably stricter, finding statutory language outlining a standard is 
key to both overcoming the DFE in FTCA claims and finding a 
fiduciary duty in claims made against the government on behalf of 
NN¶V.  
Because RCRA and CERCLA outline comprehensive duties 
for the United States government regarding the cleanup of 
ha]aUdRXV VXbVWaQceV, NN¶V aUe eQWLWOed WR PRQeWaU\ daPageV. If Whe 
federal government has failed to adhere to the duties in RCRA, the 
United States has breached its full fiduciary duty. Protecting the 
health of reservation residents is a sovereign interest under the 
Supreme Courts framework, and if the United States has substantial 
control over the regulatory scheme governing cleanup of toxic 
substances on tribal land and fails to adequately remedy the 
SROOXWLRQ, NN¶V caQ bULQg a PaUeQV PaWULae FTCA cOaLP agaLQVW Whe 
federal government.169  
 
 
 
167 88 Act of Mar. 18, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86±392, 74 Stat. 8 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 277 (2000)). Pub. L. 86±392, 74 Stat. 8 (1960 Act).  
168 White Mt. Apache Tribe v. United States United States, 537 U. S. 465, 475, 
123 S.Ct. 1126, 155 L.Ed.2d 40 (2003).  
169  Parens Patriae is a doctrine allowing a state to bring a suit on behalf of 
citizens to protect quasi-sovereign interests. See e.g., Jack Ratliff, Parens 
Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1856 (2000) (noting that Parens 
Patriae is a doctrine allowing a state to bring a suit on behalf of citizens to 
protect quasi-sovereign interests). 
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 Statutory Regimes are Non-Discretionary when Conjoined 
with the Trust Doctrine 
 
1. Abreu v. United States: How does the statutory scheme 
fit?  
 
Direct violations of RCRA cannot be used to bring FTCA 
cOaLPV becaXVe MXULVSUXdeQce haV cRQcOXded WhaW ZRXOd be ³LQdLUecW 
eQfRUcePeQW´ aV heOd LQ Abreu v. United States.170 When courts look 
at claims brought under the FTCA, they must determine if damages 
liability would undermine an already-in-place statutory regime.171 
The First Circuit discussed the need for interpreting the waiver of 
sovereign immunity of some statutes in context with other statutes 
that provide a remedy.172 The First Circuit focused on the Supreme 
CRXUW¶V hROdLQg LQ United States v. Fausto, where the Court held that 
federal employees who were denied remedy by the Civil Service 
RefRUP AcW (³CSRA´) cRXld not then obtain a remedy through the 
BacN Pa\ AcW (³BPA´).173 Because Congress enacted the CSRA as 
a comprehensive statutory scheme to address the problems of 
³haSha]aUd aUUaQgePeQWV´, Whe CSRA deQLed MXdLcLaO UeYLeZ XQdeU 
the Tucker Act and Back Pay Act.174 In Abreu, the Court also looked 
to their obligation to interpret waivers of sovereign immunity 
narrowly.175 Since the RCRA is a comprehensive statutory regime, 
and the court must construe the FTCA waiver of sovereign 
immunity narrowly, the court concluded that plaintiffs could not 
bring an FTCA claim for violations of RCRA.176 
 
2. Myers Overcomes the Discretionary Function 
Exception...For Now 
 
The FTCA enables private parties to hold the United States 
liable for tortious conduct but for many private citizens harmed, the 
discretionary function exception serves as the primary defense for 
the government to prevent adequate compensation. The DFE 
protects the federal government from liability for tortious actions 
 
170 See Abreu v. United States, 468 F.3d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 2006). 
171 Id. at 30. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 455 (1988). 
175 Abreu, 468 F.3d at 30. 
176 Id. at 31. 
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when an agency or a federal employee caused the tort while acting 
with discretion. The DFE cannot apply when the agency or 
individual acts outside of making a discretionary choice, such as 
failing to comply with specific duties outlined by legislation. When, 
however, plaintiffs have attempted to bring FTCA claims and 
overcome the DFE based on direct violations of RCRA, the First 
Circuit found that allowing so would undermine an already-in-place 
statutory regime.177  
In Myers v. United States, the plaintiff overcame the DFE by 
citing agency policy based on a specific statute (RCRA). The Myers 
plaintiffs sought compensatory damages from the United States 
through an FTCA claim for negligence.178 The plaintiffs were 
parents whose young daughter was injured after allegedly being 
exposed to thallium in soil leaked from a landfill, managed by the 
NaY\, QeaU WheLU UeVLdeQce aQd Whe chLOd¶V VchRRO.  
The plaintiffs in Myers overcame the discretionary function 
exception because the Ninth Circuit found that the Navy failed to 
comply with two internal mandatory provisions. The first of these 
mandatory provisions was a safety and health program manual 
(Program Manual)179 implemented by the Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command (Naval FEC). The second was a cleanup 
plan, known as a Federal Facility Agreement (FFA)180, where the 
Navy was responsible for designating a Quality Assurance Officer 
(QAO) to verify that the plan was followed. Looking to Bear 
Medicine to determine the second provision,181 the court found that 
language within the FFA was not mandatory, but scientific and 
professional judgment matters, especially regarding safety are not 
SURQe WR ³SROLc\ cRQVLdeUaWLRQV´ WheUefRUe Whe dLVcUeWLRQaU\ fXQcWLRQ 
does not apply.182  
Ricky R. Nelson argues in Covert RCRA Enforcement183 that 
Myers sets forth a way to use RCRA to overcome the discretionary 
function exception as long as the use is indirect. Myers got around 
 
177 Id.  
178 Myers v. United States, 652 F.3d 1021, 1027 (9th Cir. 2011). 
179 NaYal FaciliWies Eng¶g Command, U.S. Navy, NAVFACINST 5100.11J 1, 
Safety and Health Program Manual (2000) [hereinafter Program Manual].  
180 U.S. DeS¶W Rf Def., U.S. DeS¶W Rf Whe NaY\ & SWaWe Rf CaOLfRUQLa, CaPS 
Pendleton Marine Corps Base Federal Facility Agreement (1990). 
181 MaUO\V BeaU MedLcLQe Y. UQLWed SWaWeV e[ UeO. Sec¶\ Rf Whe DeS¶W Rf IQWeULRr, 
241 F.3d at 1208, 1213-17 (9th Cir. 2001). 
182 Myers v. United States, 652 F.3d 1021, 1032 (9th Cir. 2011). 
183 Supra note 26.  
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Abreu, by citing Agency Policy that was based on RCRA. Likewise, 
advocates for those who have been harmed by toxic torts potentially 
covered by RCRA should look for internal agency standards and 
guidelines that prohibit the action that caused damage. 
 
3. Introduce the Trust Doctrine to Give Myers More Bite  
 
An alternative strategy to argue that under FTCA, damages 
liability does not undermine CERCLA or RCRA, but is necessary to 
reinforce these statutes in instances involving NNs where the trust 
doctrine creates a duty, it reinforces these statutes. Neither Myers 
nor Abreu, however, addressed situations regarding Native Nations, 
where the United States has a heightened duty of responsibility.  
In Indian Towing Co. v. U.S., the Coast Guard used 
discretion in deciding to operate a lighthouse.184 Once the Coast 
Guard exercised this discretion, it had a duty to use due care.185 The 
fedeUaO gRYeUQPeQW haV fXOO UeVSRQVLbLOLW\ ³WR PaQage IQdLaQ 
UeVRXUceV aQd OaQd fRU Whe beQefLW Rf Whe IQdLaQV.´186 When 
government agencies take on the responsibility to oversee certain 
aVSecWV Rf PaQagLQg Whe UeVRXUceV Rf NN¶V WhURXgh Whe DeSaUWPeQW 
of the Interior, the government has a heightened duty of care, as the 
court found in Marlys Bear Medicine.187 In a situation like San 
Carlos, where a federal agency contaminated a reservation by 
directly infecting the land with a toxic chemical after approval from 
the BIA, surely the BIA was exercising comprehensive control 
parallel to the control exercised in Marlys Bear Medicine. 
Additionally, the Snyder Act should impose a duty on the BIA to 
remedy the harm, as the court held the agency had a duty to do so in 
Blue Legs v. EPA. Once the government understood the harms 
Agent Orange exposure caused, the BIA and Forest Service should 
have taken steps to remediate the reservation and warn the 
community about potential health hazards.  
If Whe SOaLQWLff¶V LQ Myers were able to win a FTCA claim by 
merely citing internal agency policy, the Trust Doctrine should be 
able to create a heightened duty of enforcement for RCRA and 
CERCLA. If the RQO\ Za\ WR RbWaLQ daPageV LV WhURXgh ³cRYeUW´ XVe 
of RCRA and CERCLA, government agencies will eventually claim 
 
184 Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 62 (1955). 
185 Id. at 64. 
186 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224. 
187 Marlys Bear Medicine, 241 F.3d at 1220. 
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that like Abreu, enforcing FTCA liability for non-compliance with 
agency policy that mirrors statutes, would undermine statutory 
regimes.  
WheQ defeQdLQg LWVeOf agaLQVW NN¶V, Whe UQLWed SWaWeV haV 
beeQ abOe WR cOaLP WhaW Whe dLVSXWed chRLce ZaV ³dLVcUeWLRQaU\,´ 
unless there is a distinct piece of legislation outlining a duty, such 
as in United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe.188 When 
reviewing torts from hazardous substances on tribal lands, however, 
the courts should look at violations of broad environmental statutes 
such as CERCLA and RCRA combined with considerations of the 
SQ\deU AcW¶V RbOLgaWLRQV Rf Whe BIA WR cRQVeUYe heaOWh, aQd Whe 
heightened duty of the United States under the Trust Doctrine to 
overcome the DFE.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In the book of Matthew, Jesus said that it was easier for a 
camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter 
the kingdom of heaven. Winning an FTCA claim in federal court is 
just as difficult.189 Apparently, neither are impossible, but in spite of 
the case law and theory that creates a plausible legal argument to 
support claims on behalf of Native Nations against the federal 
government for toxic torts, the realistic probability of being 
successful in federal court is slim.  
Biblical scholars have been debating the interpretation of the 
ShUaVe ³WhURXgh Whe e\e Rf a QeedOe´ aV ZeOO aV Whe WUaQVOaWLRQ Rf 
³caPeO´ fRU decadeV.190 SLPLOaUO\, ³Whe dLscretionary function 
exception has become the most litigated provision of a much 
OLWLgaWed VWaWXWe´.191 The United States, though, took on a moral duty 
 
188 White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 481 (2003). 
189 Matthew 19:23-26 (NIV). 
190 See e.g., Duncan, J., & Derrett, M., A Camel Through the Eye of a Needle, 32 
NEW TESTAMENT STUDIES 3, pp. 32(3), 465--470. (1986); WERNER H KERBEL, 
THE ORAL AND THE WRITTEN GOSPEL: THE HERMENEUTICS OF SPEAKING AND 
WRITING IN THE SYNOPTIC TRADITION, MARK, PAUL AND Q, 73 (INDIANA 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1997). but see, Theodore R. Lorah, Jr., Again²Camel or 
Rope in Matthew 19.24 and Mark 10.25? (Jan. 28, 1996), 
http://tmcdaniel.palmerseminary.edu/camel-hawser.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7CJ-
33YP]; James G. Crossley, The Damned Rich (Mark 10:17±31), EXPOSITORY 
TIMES 397, 399 (2005). 
191 D. Scott Barash, The Discretionary Function Exception and Mandatory 
Regulations, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1300, 1301 (1987).  
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VROLdLfLed b\ MXULVSUXdeQce VRRQ afWeU Whe cRXQWU\¶V¶ LQceSWLRQ.192 
This moral duty should be considered by courts looking to apply the 
DFE in specific circumstances regarding Native Nations. Because 
significant case law bolsters the legal argument for Nations to 
successfully overcome the DFE bring toxic tort FTCA claims, the 
Trust Doctrine should create a full fiduciary relationship, or, at the 
minimum, a limited trust responsibility. As seen in Marlys Bear 
Medicine, where the DFE could not be used to protect the federal 
government from liability inconsistently from how a private 
defendant would be liable, the DFE should not protect the United 
States from liability for egregious toxic torts in Indian Country.193 
 
**** 
 
  
 
192 Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297. 
193 Marlys Bear Medicine, 241 F.3d at 1213. 
